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A HYPOTHETICAL INTERACTION FOR CONSIDERATION 
It is a sunny day in Oregon. Cars sporadically pass by the fields, 
their passengers admiring the bucolic countryside or thinking about 
their ultimate destination. Two adjoining properties, each with vast 
amounts of land, are separated only by the road that carries cars to 
their destinations. On one side of the road, the farmer grows Crop A—
a self-pollinating crop. Her neighbor across the road grows Crop B—
a cross-pollinating crop. Crops A and B are of the same species; 
however, they differ in variety. 
The farmer who grows Crop A has repeatedly requested that her 
neighbor grow his Crop B on the other side of his property, further 
away from the road. The farmer of Crop A feared accidental cross-
pollination that would result in Crop A’s fertilization, resulting in Crop 
AB (which has a lower market value than Crop A). The farmer of Crop 
A, who saves seeds after harvest, is concerned about the long-term 
health of her seeds. If pollen from Crop A cross-pollinated, it would not 
affect the future development of Crop B. The farmer of Crop B resists 
this, wanting to restore the soil further from the road to avoid soil 
degradation. 
There is a breeze, characteristic of the season. In that breeze, pollen 
from Crop B floats across the narrow country road. Further down, a 
bee, sprinkled in pollen from Crop B, floats across the road to explore 
the fields of Crop A. Pollen from Crop B ultimately ends up impacting 
Crop A. However, the farmer of Crop A does not realize that the 
interaction has occurred until the next harvest, when she realizes that 
the seeds that she had saved have resulted in a field of Crop AB. 
The farmer, who expected and cared for Crop A, is left with a field 
of Crop AB, at no direct fault of the farmer of Crop B. Does the farmer 
of Crop A have a remedy? Does the farmer of Crop B not have a right 
to grow whatever is best suited to his land?  
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INTRODUCTION 
he hypothetical above, while simplified, can be a reality for 
farmers in Oregon. What is cultivated on a neighboring property 
has the potential to shape the harvest of another. Farming is an 
inherently risky venture. While a farmer may take great care to foster 
the growth of her crop, factors outside her control may result in a 
lifeless field by harvest time.  
Oregon’s right-to-farm law, codified at ORS 30.936, provides: 
(1) No farming or forest practice on lands zoned for farm or forest
use shall give rise to any private right of action or claim for relief
based on nuisance or trespass.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a right of action
or claim for relief for:
(a) Damage to commercial agricultural products; or
(b) Death or serious physical injury . . . . 
(3) Subsection (1) of this section applies regardless of whether the
farming or forest practice has undergone any change or interruption.1
Oregon’s right-to-farm law insulates farmers from liability from 
neighbors’ nuisance and trespass claims, unless the nuisance or trespass 
results in “[d]amage to commercial agricultural products.”2 However, 
the definition of “damage to commercial agricultural products” is 
ambiguous, inconsistent, unexplained, and outdated.3 The damage 
component of the exception is not the text’s only component that raises 
questions. The protections from trespass and nuisance liability do not 
extend to actions that damage commercial agricultural products, which 
implies that the ban on private suits still protects farmers who damage 
noncommercial agricultural products.4 
A clear definition of “damage to commercial agricultural products” 
is critical because an unclear understanding results in inconsistency, 
unfairness, and an incentive to grow more sturdy crops at the expense 
of more delicate, exacting crops. Shielding farmers from liability for 
their farms’ operations is a state-sanctioned granting of power. In legal 
1 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.936 (2019) (emphasis added). 
2 Id. § 30.936(2)(a). 
3 Of the limited caselaw that exists involving ORS 30.936, no case adequately explains 
or defines what constitutes “damage to commercial agricultural products.” 
4 Lisa N. Thomas, Forgiving Nuisance and Trespass: Is Oregon’s Right-to-Farm Law 
Constitutional?, 16 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 445, 458 (2001). 
T 
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battles, the smallholder farmer will likely be unable to withstand the 
pressure from the more capital-rich industrial farmer across the road.  
Power dynamics in agriculture do not abide by a binary, where one 
set of actors always holds the power while another party is always 
at its mercy. Thus, agricultural conflicts between individual farmers 
lack the proverbial “good guy” versus the ill-intentioned “bad guy”—
there are two parties, each with valid propositions about their own 
sovereignty. Power dynamics fluctuate depending on the crop type and 
the manner in which the party is raising that crop.5 Often, there are the 
smallholder organic farmers resisting encroachment by large 
conventional farmers, but there are also smallholder farmers growing 
conventional crops who face legal threats from large organic farms that 
fear cross-contamination.  
Power dynamics can shift according to the governing law. For 
instance, in Oregon, marijuana farmers may exert power relative to a 
neighboring farm at the state level, but at the federal level the marijuana 
farmers can be at the mercy of a neighboring farm growing another 
crop because marijuana is still illegal.6 While the characteristics 
and practices of a given farmer are not reliable indicators in mapping 
power relations, economic resources are a useful indicator of power in 
a relationship. As this Comment will show, vignettes of farms in 
Oregon are useful for examining these power dynamics in light of the 
ambiguity in the “damage” exception.  
Statutory ambiguity in the “damage” exception serves those with the 
fiscal resources to litigate their position. Ambiguity serves those with 
money because they can navigate the legal system in a way that serves 
their interests. Farmers who are already struggling to turn a profit in a 
volatile market are not going to risk the expenses of litigating an issue 
where an outcome is undeterminable. The purpose of the right-to-farm 
law was originally to mitigate legal disputes as urban sprawl stretched 
closer to farmlands;7 Oregon’s right-to-farm law was not designed to 
handle disputes between farmers. Other schemes regulate agriculture.8 
The right-to-farm scheme was not drafted to consider that two farmers, 
5 While it will not be discussed in this Comment, there are myriad other power dynamics 
and interactions in agricultural relations, including around race, gender, ethnicity, and class, 
just to name a few.  
6 See, e.g., Momtazi Fam., LLC v. Wagner, No. 3:19-CV-00476-BR, 2019 WL 4059178, 
at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 27, 2019). 
7 Schultz Fam. Farms LLC v. Jackson Cnty., No. 1:14-CV-01975, 2015 WL 3448069, 
at *4 (D. Or. May 29, 2015). 
8 See generally OR. REV. STAT. § 561.005 (2019).  
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both practicing entirely in the realm of reasonability, could have 
incompatible or competing interests.  
Damage is less ambiguous in the context of a farmer living adjacent 
to an urbanite; for example, if a farmer’s cattle break down a neighbor’s 
fence and cause property damage, there is a clear measure of damages 
that could open a farmer up to liability. However, in a farmer-versus-
farmer context, there are areas of natural interaction, like cross-
pollination. Without a clear definition of damage, legal remedies are 
unclear given the liability shield. The ambiguity of the “damage” 
exception in the right-to-farm law permits two reasonable farmers to 
litigate trespass and nuisance claims. 
An ethos of autonomy runs throughout the history of American 
agriculture.9 The mythos of the American farmer is well recognized—
a recognizable trope consists of a red barn, surrounded by crops 
and farm animals, where there is nothing but farmland as far as the eye 
can see. However, in the twenty-first century, the farmer does not live 
in the frontier—he has neighbors. What one farmer does on his own 
farm can impact his neighbor’s farm. There is an inherent tension in 
property rights: one has a right to operate their land (within reason) as 
they best see fit; however, the effects of that farmer’s actions do 
not necessarily respect property boundaries. There is clear tension 
between individualism, on one hand, and ecological and commercial 
interdependence on the other. One farmer’s choice to apply pesticides, 
for example, can impact the economic bottom line of a neighboring 
farmer.  
Debates as to the duties of farmers on agricultural lands are often 
framed in terms of stewardship, steeped in notions of intergenerational 
preservation and Jeffersonian agrarian idealism.10 What grows on one 
farm, however, impacts more than just that particular farmer. There is 
a fundamental tension in agriculture between land sovereignty and 
ecological interdependence. Farmers should not have external factors 
beyond their control limit the scope of their land’s possibilities; 
however, a farmer’s choices can impact their neighbor’s scope of 
possibilities for their land use, and vice versa. Impacts, nevertheless, 
are neither necessarily nor inherently damaging. The tension between 
9 See Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical Issues Shaping 
Agricultural Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 225–26 (1993); see also H.W. Brands, Why Have 
Americans Always Been So Obsessed with Land?, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news 
/american-land-frontier [https://perma.cc/KJ69-AWBB] (last updated Jan. 31, 2019). 
10 See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 225–26. 
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autonomy and interdependence cannot ever be resolved; however, the 
law can expect such a tension and determine the boundary of acceptable 
behavior relative to one’s neighbor. 
Since “damage” is undefined in Oregon’s right-to-farm law, the 
extent and type of damage necessary to expose a farmer to liability 
can range depending on both the case and the judge. Damage, left 
undefined, can represent slight diminution in value for an otherwise 
marketable commercial product, or it can necessitate complete crop 
demise before a neighboring farmer’s affirmative defense of their right-
to-farm is judicially questionable. There should be a consistent 
definition of “damage” to commercial agricultural products under 
Oregon’s right-to-farm law. Without a clear definition, cases where the 
damage is a triable issue of fact will result in inconsistent caselaw. The 
inconsistency in holdings will promote inequities of access to remedy, 
with some farmers deciding that the risk of costly litigation with no 
guaranteed success is not worth any potential remedy that they may 
receive for what they deem to be damage to their crops.  
In Part I, this Comment will examine the history of Oregon’s right-
to-farm law, noting that the Oregon Legislature was concerned about 
unreasonable lawsuits brought by urbanites moving into Oregon’s 
agricultural lands against the farmer engaged in reasonable farming 
practices—not lawsuits brought by farmers against one another. Part I 
will also describe how legal disputes will continue between 
neighboring farmers in the absence of a clear definition of “damage.” 
Part I will also delve into the interplay between Oregon’s right-to-farm 
law and the Oregon Constitution.  
In Part II, this Comment explores three vignettes from Oregon’s 
farmlands to demonstrate how ambiguity in the “damage” exception 
creates legal disputes between two farmers who are both engaged 
in reasonable farming practices. Part II will demonstrate how the 
ambiguity in Oregon’s right-to-farm law can be used to advance 
personal motivations at the expense of farmers’ autonomy. Part II also 
affords significant consideration to the impact of legal marijuana 
farming in Oregon on other farmers under the regime of the right-to-
farm law.  
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I 
THE RIGHT TO FARM 
A. Oregon’s Right-to-Farm Law
Oregon has a strong right-to-farm law that not only insulates the 
reasonable farmer from nuisance claims but also from trespass claims. 
Adopted in 1993,11 Oregon’s right-to-farm law states, “No farming or 
forest practice on lands zoned for farm or forest use shall give rise to 
any private right of action or claim for relief based on nuisance or 
trespass.”12 Nuisance and trespass include but are not limited to 
“claims based on noise, vibration, odors, smoke, dust, mist from 
irrigation, use of pesticides and use of crop production substances.”13 
Once a defendant raises the right-to-farm defense, the plaintiff alleging 
the damage has the burden of establishing that the defense is not 
applicable.14 For example, in Hood River County v. Mazzara, the court 
of appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that prolonged dog barking 
did not fall under the protections of the right-to-farm defense, noting 
that the county had failed to satisfy its burden to show that the defense 
was not applicable.15 Notably, the immunity from private action 
“applies regardless of whether the farming or forest practice has 
undergone any change or interruption.”16 This is designed to ensure 
that farmers are protected from liability, even if there has been a recent 
change in how or when the farm operates.17 
1. Farming Practices
A farming practice is defined as “a mode of operation on a farm”
that is similarly and reasonably used on other farms to obtain a profit 
in a manner that complies with relevant laws and is “done in a 
11 Oregon’s right-to-farm law was updated in 1995 and 2001. NAT. RES. PROGRAMS, 
OR. DEP’T AGRIC., Oregon’s Right-to-Farm Law (Apr. 2021), https://www.oregon.gov 
/ODA/shared/Documents/Publications/NaturalResources/RightToFarm.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/28JM-C2XL].  
12 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.936(1) (2019). 
13 Id. § 30.932.  
14 See Hood River Cnty. v. Mazzara, 89 P.3d 1195, 1197 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). 
15 Id. at 1199; Harrison M. Pittman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Right-to-
Farm Acts, § 18, 8 A.L.R. 6th 465 (2005). 
16 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.936(3) (2019). 
17 See, e.g., Jewett v. Deerhorn Enters., Inc., 281 Or. 469, 479 (1978) (exemplifying 
how, prior to passage of Oregon’s right-to-farm law, a court affirmed a permanent injunction 
against a pig farmer’s operations, in part because the neighbor’s residence was established 
prior to the establishment of the pig farm). 
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reasonable and prudent manner.”18 Reasonable farming practices 
include practices that are used on similar farmlands and are “generally 
accepted, reasonable, and prudent” commercial farming methods that 
are reasonably performed or otherwise follow pertinent laws.19 
Oregon’s right-to-farm law was drafted in a more far-reaching way 
than most other states’ right-to-farm laws, shielding farmers on all 
lands zoned for farming or forest use, regardless of when the farming 
operations commenced, for not only nuisance but also for trespass.20 
Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality, Department of 
State Lands, State Department of Agriculture, and State Forestry 
Department are statutorily authorized to dismiss complaints without 
any investigation if they deem the complaint to be based on protected 
farming practices.21 A great deal of discretion is afforded to farmers 
relative to their neighbors, so long as the farming stays reasonable. 
The liability shields are intended to be absolute across the state. The 
state legislature both statutorily invalidated any existing local rules and 
disallowed any future local regulations from making a farming practice 
a nuisance or trespass where ORS 30.936 would otherwise govern.22 
Oregon’s Legislature not only limited a private citizen’s ability to 
allege nuisance or trespass but also declared that “the authority of 
local governments and special districts” to label farming practices as 
either nuisance or trespass was to be curtailed.23 This limiting of 
local powers’ ability to influence farming activities was to avoid 
inconsistency with state land use policies.24  
There are two statutory exceptions that limit a farmer’s immunity. 
First, the immunity does not extend to claims relating to “[d]eath or 
serious physical injury.”25 The second exception, the one of focus in 
this Comment, is that the immunity does not apply to claims for relief 
for “[d]amage to commercial agricultural products.”26 The Oregon 
Legislature designed this exception to allow commercial farmers a 
remedy through private suit if the actions of other farmers damaged 
18 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.930(2) (2019); Hood River Cnty., 89 P.3d at 1196–97. 
19 NAT. RES. PROGRAMS, supra note 11. 
20 Thomas, supra note 4, at 448. 
21 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.943 (2019). 
22 Id. § 30.935. 
23 Id. § 30.933(2)(d). 
24 Id.  
25 Id. § 30.936(2)(b). 
26 Id. § 30.936(2)(a). 
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their commercial crops.27 However, “damage” is not defined in the 
context of Oregon’s right-to-farm law. The “damage to commercial 
agricultural products” exception inherently presumes that a liable 
farmer acted unreasonably; otherwise, such “damage to commercial 
agricultural products” would not have occurred.  
2. The Legislative History Behind Oregon’s Right-to-Farm Law
Oregon codified the policy considerations and legislative findings
that shaped the drafting of Oregon’s right-to-farm laws.28 The state’s 
agricultural land use policy centers on protections of the agricultural 
way of life; the Oregon Legislature declared that rural lands are 
important to the public, “justif[ying] incentives and privileges . . . to 
encourage owners of rural lands to hold such lands in exclusive farm 
use zones.”29 The state legislature wanted to curtail the ability of local 
governments to label some farming practices as a trespass or a 
nuisance, which would be “inconsistent with land use policies,”30 
adversely affecting some farmers while not impacting others. The 
creation of Oregon’s right-to-farm law reflects the state legislature’s 
understanding that farming is a crucial part of Oregon’s economy.31 
Not only does agriculture support Oregon’s economy, but it was also 
deemed an essential component of natural resource preservation.32 
The Oregon Legislature, like the legislatures in many other states, 
was concerned that farmers could face legal repercussions for the 
realities of operating a farm as residential communities expanded closer 
to agricultural lands.33 Specifically, the Oregon Legislature was 
concerned about private suits brought for noise, smoke, dust, vibration, 
odors, and pesticide use—results of acceptable farming practices 
occurring outside an urban growth boundary.34 In order to prevent legal 
disputes regarding farming practices, the Legislature found it wise to 
insulate farmers from liability from actions that “may be intended to 
limit, or have the effect of limiting, farming and forest practices.”35 
27 Jennifer Bennett, Act vs. Amendment: Schultz Family Farms, Legislative Exceptions, 
and the Future of Right-to-Farm, 23 J. ENV’T & SUSTAINABILITY L. 2, 4 (2016).  
28 See § 30.933 (2019).  
29 Id. § 215.243(4) (noting Oregon’s general agricultural land use policy). 
30 Id. § 30.933(2)(d). 
31 Id. §30.933(1)(a). 
32 Id. § 215.243(1) (noting Oregon’s general agricultural land use policy). 
33 Id. §§ 30.933(1)(b), 215.243(3). 
34 Id. § 30.932; H.B. 2731, 71st Or. Legis. Assemb. (2001). 
35 § 30.933(1)(c) (2019). 
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Statutorily, the Legislature declared that “[p]ersons who locate on or 
near an area zoned for farm or forest use must accept the conditions 
commonly associated with living in that particular setting.”36 The law 
was drafted with those not accustomed to farming practices in mind, 
rather than other farmers. The text and history of the law demonstrate 
that the primary concern of the Oregon Legislature was urban 
encroachment.37  
Oregon’s Legislature intended to protect farmers from ruinous 
litigation as residential uses encroached on agricultural lands because 
farming practices are “critical to the economic welfare of th[e] state.”38 
Prior to the enactment of Oregon’s right-to-farm law in 1993, farmers 
could be liable for their farming operations depending on the 
substantiality of the interference, the nature of the neighborhood 
(residential as compared to agricultural), and the effect on “the 
enjoyment of life, health, and property.”39 The Legislature was aware 
that conflict was likely to arise between varying uses of the land as 
urban development expanded onto lands traditionally used for resource 
cultivation.40 Recognizing that “neighboring suburbanites, who 
inevitably find the farming practices loud, smelly, invasive, or simply 
irritating,” would bring suit for nuisance or trespass against farmers, 
the Oregon Legislature “tip[ped] the scales in favor of the farms.”41 
Conversely, the Legislature did not want to permit farmers to behave 
negligently. The “damage to commercial agricultural products” 
exception is indicative of the Legislature’s lack of desire to “give free 
license to use any farming practices.”42  
However, there is no indication that the Legislature considered 
“damage” in detail. The commerciality component of the exception 
implies that the Legislature wanted to permit compensation where a 
farmer could no longer market his or her crop. Oregon courts, until 
recently, have not had a justiciable controversy that would allow them 
36 Id. § 30.933(2)(c). 
37 Schultz Fam. Farms LLC v. Jackson Cnty., No. 1:14-CV-01975, 2015 WL 3448069, 
at *4 (D. Or. May 29, 2015). 
38 Id. at *3 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.933(1)(a)). 
39 See, e.g., Jewett v. Deerhorn Enters., Inc., 281 Or. 469, 473 (1978) (affirming a 
decision to permanently enjoin a pig farm’s operations as the only “effective remedy” to 
address the offending smells and sounds of the pig farm. Id. at 479.).  
40 § 30.933(1)(b) (2019). 
41 Schultz Fam. Farms LLC, 2015 WL 3448069, at *4. 
42 Id.  
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to interpret Oregon’s right-to-farm law.43 The “damage to commercial 
agricultural crops” exception was the Legislature’s recognition that  
not all farming practices are shielded from liability.44 The “damage” 
exception prevents farmers from being able to rely on the right-to- 
farm scheme to justify the use of unreasonable farming practices.45 
However, damage can exist on a spectrum. An unclear understanding 
of the sort of damage the Legislature intended to address will result in 
judicial inconsistency.  
Oregon’s Department of Agriculture realizes that Oregon’s right-to-
farm law will not adequately protect all farmers, advising farmers 
that “it is in [their] best interests to prevent and resolve conflict where 
possible and maintain good relationships with neighbors.”46 However, 
disputes are likely to arise between neighboring farmers, even after 
good faith communication. Oregon’s right-to-farm law has not 
adequately evolved to address modern disputes. For example, there is 
a concern that Oregon’s right-to-farm law does not adequately address 
concerns around the new Oregonian hemp and marijuana industries.47 
This is a matter of competing property rights. Where there are 
competing rights, there is the risk that any power imbalance will dictate 
the outcome of the dispute. It is also a matter of balancing the duty that 
farmers owe to their own land and the duty they owe to a neighbor—a 
balancing act that is as old as the concept of private property. If a suit 
is brought for nuisance or trespass from any reasonable farming 
practice, the prevailing party can win attorney fees and costs at trial and 
on appeal.48 This can greatly impact smaller farmers who might feel as 
though their crops have been damaged but fear being defeated in court 
and having to pay attorney fees.49 The legislative history of Oregon’s 
43 Bennett, supra note 27, at 12 (noting the minimal citation to the relevant parts of 
Oregon’s right-to-farm law in caselaw).  
44 Id. at 21. 
45 Id. (referencing Schultz Family Farms LLC v. Jackson County, at *4). 
46 NAT. RES. PROGRAMS, supra note 11 (advising farmers to “communicate early and 
often”; “[s]hare, in as much detail as possible, the challenges you face”; and “[t]alk about 
the various options that might provide a solution to the challenges you face, and the costs 
associated with each.”).  
47 See Ted Krempa, Your View: Right-to-Farm Rules Shouldn’t Shield Hemp, MAIL 
TRIB. (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.mailtribune.com/editorials/2019/10/15/your-view-right 
-to-farm-rules-shouldnt-shield-hemp/ [https://perma.cc/9BAE-F7J5].
48 NAT. RES. PROGRAMS, supra note 11.
49 The Associated Press, Oregon’s “Right to Farm” Law Called into Question in
Pesticide Dispute, OREGONIAN, https://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/2016
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Right-to-Farm Act indicates that the law was not intended to solve 
these eternal disputes through the “damage” exception.50 However, a 
clarified definition of damage would be indicative of what duty a 
farmer owes to his neighbor. If the exception is to govern disputes 
arising from a farmer’s autonomy on his own land and its impact on his 
neighbor, then what constitutes damage should be defined.  
B. Potential Future Legal Disputes Given the Ambiguity
of “Damage” 
A clearer definition of damage is needed so that farmers who feel 
that they have experienced a loss have confidence in bringing suit, and 
so that farmers know what is expected legally of them vis-à-vis their 
neighbor. Damage could require the complete annihilation of a crop. 
Damage could also be defined as any diminution in value to the crop, 
no matter how small or inconsequential. While nuisance and trespass 
claims between farmers would likely overlap in most cases, it is worth 
considering the two claims independently.  
1. Trespass
Trespass is defined in Oregon as “any intrusion which invades the
possessor’s protected interest in exclusive possession, whether that 
intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy 
which can be measured only by the mathematical language of the 
physicist.”51 Trespass must be intentional, meaning that the intruder is 
aware of the intrusion, even if the intruder does not mean to cause 
harm.52 While harm is not a necessary element to establish trespass, 
damage that establishes that invisible trespass has occurred is an 
/05/oregons_right_to_farm_law_ques.html [https://perma.cc/WPB2-26BX] (last updated 
Jan. 9, 2019). 
50 See, e.g., H.B. 2731, 71st Or. Legis. Assemb. (2001) (demonstrating how amendments 
to the law focused on the growth of urban boundaries); see also Schultz Fam. Farms LLC 
v. Jackson Cnty., No. 1:14-CV-01975, 2015 WL 3448069, at *4 (D. Or. May 29, 2015)
(noting that “[t]he exception demonstrates that the Right to Farm Act does not give free
license to use any farming practices. While farming practices may not be limited by a
suburbanite’s sensitivities, they may be limited if they cause damage to another farm’s
crops.”).
51 Thomas, supra note 4, at 457 (quoting Davis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 445 P.2d 481, 
483 (Or. 1968)). 
52 Id. 
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important component in establishing causation.53 Additionally, an 
unpermitted entry onto the soil of another is trespass at common law.54 
Oregon’s Supreme Court has followed the first Restatement of 
Torts, adopting a rule that liability for unintentional intrusion can 
only be found when the intrusion stems out of “negligence or an 
ultrahazardous activity.”55 However, Oregon’s highest court has 
recognized standard farming practices as trespass. In Ream v. Keen, the 
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a court of appeals’ finding that smoke 
from controlled burns on a farm could result in trespass; however, the 
Oregon Supreme Court significantly noted that it could not reach the 
issue of the farmer’s right-to-farm defense due to a preservation 
issue.56  
Reasonable farming practices include the proper and permitted 
application of pesticides.57 However, pesticides can trespass across 
property lines and land on crops that were supposed to remain 
organic.58 While unreasonable application of pesticides is not protected 
under the right-to-farm law,59 the organic farmer is left without remedy 
if a neighbor properly applies pesticides and then asserts a right-to-farm 
defense if the pesticides cross boundaries.  
As will be discussed throughout this Comment, pollen poses an 
interesting conundrum for Oregon’s right-to-farm law given the 
ambiguity of the “damage” exception. Oregon’s Supreme Court has 
held that microscopic emissions from an aluminum reduction plant 
entering a livestock farmer’s land constituted trespass.60 It is likely 
that Oregon’s courts would continue to reject the idea that trespass 
necessitates an invasion of a certain physical size.61 An unclear 
53 Id. 
54 Carvalho v. Wolfe, 140 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).  
55 Id. at 1163–64 (adopting §§ 158, 165 of the Restatement (First) of Torts).  
56 Ream v. Keen, 838 P.2d 1073, 1075–76 (Or. 1992).  
57 NAT. RES. PROGRAMS, supra note 11. 
58 See Hale v. State, 314 P.3d 345, 346 (Or. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 354 Or. 840 
(2014) (noting that the initial litigation was between organic farmers and nonorganic 
neighbors whose pesticides allegedly drifted across and infected the plaintiffs’ organic 
crops. The suit was ultimately voluntarily dismissed after defendants asserted their right-to-
farm defense. Id. Plaintiffs then filed suit against the State, alleging that Oregon’s right-to-
farm law unconstitutionally deprived them of a remedy. Id.). 
59 The Associated Press, supra note 49. 
60 Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 797 (Or. 1959); Shené Mitchell, 
Organic Crops, Genetic Drift, and Commingling: Theories of Remedy and Defense, 
18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 313, 321 (2013). 
61 See Mitchell, supra note 60, at 321. 
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definition of damage, coupled with the microscopic nature of pollen, 
could result in an increase of litigation where farmers claim that their 
neighbor’s right-to-farm defense is inapplicable because cross-
pollination caused “damage” to their commercial crops. This is 
especially likely to arise in the context where genetically modified 
crops cross-pollinate onto organic fields (resulting in a loss of organic 
certification) or where the plaintiff farmer is growing a crop that needs 
to avoid external pollination. 
2. Nuisance
For an actionable claim of nuisance, an interference must be a
substantial “non-trespassory interference with another’s private use 
and enjoyment of [his or her] land,” even if the action is otherwise 
legal.62 In determining whether actionable nuisance occurred, a court 
will first determine whether there is a substantial and unreasonable 
interference with use and enjoyment of the claimant’s land.63 Rather 
than relying on fixed general rules to determine the validity of a 
nuisance allegation, courts will assess a particular case’s individual 
facts.64 In describing nuisance, the Oregon Court of Appeals has 
described five factors that determine the substantiality of the 
interference: (1) the location, (2) the neighborhood’s character, (3) the 
interference’s nature, (4) the interference’s frequency, and (5) the 
effect of the interference on “plaintiff’s enjoyment of life, health, and 
property.”65 
Oregon’s right-to-farm law shields farmers from liability in private 
nuisance lawsuits.66 Without this shield, a neighbor “whose property 
or personal enjoyment thereof is affected by a private nuisance[] may 
maintain an action for damages therefor.”67 The liability protection, 
however, does not cover private nuisances that result in “[d]amage 
to commercial agricultural products.”68 If a neighbor alleges that 
a condition on one farmer’s property resulted in “damage” to the 
“commercial agricultural products” grown by that neighboring farmer, 
62 Thomas, supra note 4, at 456 (quoting Mark v. State Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 974 
P.2d 716, 719 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)).
63 Smith v. Wallowa Cnty., 929 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
64 Id.
65 Thomas, supra note 4, at 456.
66 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.936(1) (2019).
67 Id. § 105.505.
68 Id. § 30.936(2)(a).
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the right-to-farm law permits the neighboring farmer to bring suit for 
nuisance.  
A notable component of Oregon’s right-to-farm law is its reliance 
on reasonability of the farming practice as the baseline scope for a 
farmer’s protections. For a farming practice to be shielded from 
nuisance suits, it has to be a reasonable farming practice.69 However, 
the courtroom is often far from the farm. Agriculture is highly 
technical, and the nuances of a practice can be easily lost upon someone 
who has no exposure to agriculture. Given the urban-rural divide in the 
United States, details are likely to get lost in translation. A judge or jury 
must be convinced of a farming practice’s reasonableness. While the 
legislature provided evidence of some types of farming practices that it 
had in mind, such as noise or vibrations,70 not all disputes will be as 
clearly outlined. 
3. Pollination and a Potential Cause of Action Given the Ambiguity of
“Damage”
One of the biggest unexplored disputes with Oregon’s right-to-farm 
law is whether cross-pollination from one lot to another could 
constitute “damage to commercial agricultural products,” thereby 
removing the farmer’s shield from liability. In considering this 
potential dispute, it is important to consider how pollination from a 
neighboring lot can alter a farmer’s ultimate crop and subsequent 
harvests. 
Pollination is the reproductive process of plants. Selective breeding 
and pollinating of crops has developed agricultural diversity over 
thousands of years.71 Pollen from plants with desired characteristics 
has been transferred to other crops, resulting in a new variety of plant 
over time.72 Pollination is the transfer of pollen from the male anther 
of a plant to the female stigma.73 Plants can be either self-pollinating, 
whereby the plant can fertilize itself, or cross-pollinating, whereby the 
crop needs an external force to transfer the pollen to another flower of 
69 Id. § 30.930(2). 
70 H.B. 2731, 71st Or. Legis. Assemb. (2001); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 30.932 (2019). 
71 Ania Wieczorek & Mark Wright, History of Agricultural Biotechnology: How Crop 




73 What Is Pollination?, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.fs.fed.us/wildflowers/pollinators 
/What_is_Pollination [https://perma.cc/T8RS-7NSN]. 
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the same species.74 External vectors that move pollen to cross-
pollinating plants can include the wind or an animal’s movement— 
for example, a bee can collect pollen grains on its body and move it 
to another flower as it collects nectar.75 Most plants cross-pollinate, 
resulting in a vast variation of genetic material; whereas self-
pollinating plants self-reproduce, resulting in identical offspring.76  
Seeds, which carry the genetic information to produce a new plant, 
are produced when the pollen is transferred between the same species 
of flowers.77 Cross-pollination can occur only between varieties of the 
same species but not between entirely different species.78 However, 
given the rise of the monocrop economy in much of the United States79 
and given the fact that certain environments tend to suit certain crops, 
it is not difficult to imagine that pollen has to travel very far to find 
another crop of the same species.  
The fruit that is ultimately cultivated from a plant that another 
variety of the same species has cross-pollinated will not be affected for 
that cycle; however, it can impact the crop of any seeds planted from 
that cross-pollinated crop.80 This is notable given the practice of many 
farmers of saving seeds—can seeds that cannot be saved for replanting 
due to cross-pollination be considered damaged commercial 
agricultural products? Under a textualist reading of the exception, the 
seeds are not directly “commercial,” meaning that the seeds are not for 
direct commercial profit (apart from farmers who sell the seeds in the 
commercial market). However, these seeds would be the critical 
component of a farmer’s ability to produce the future commercial 
agricultural product.  
Cross-pollination is a natural process that can occur between farms 
without the farmers ever realizing it. The crops do not have to be 
directly adjacent for the cross-pollination to occur. One study on wheat 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Mark Goodwin, Pollution Basics, SCIENCE LEARNING HUB (June 6, 2012), https:// 
www.sciencelearn.org.nz/videos/1755-pollination-basics [https://perma.cc/58U3-G6PP] 
(quoting a transcript of a video). 
77 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., supra note 73. 
78 Heather Rhoades, Cross Pollination in Plants: Cross Pollinating Vegetables, 
GARDENING KNOW HOW, https://www.gardeningknowhow.com/edible/vegetables/vgen 
/cross-pollination.htm [https://perma.cc/P9YU-VWKT] (last updated Feb. 22, 2021).  
79 E.g., Tamar Haspel, Monocrops: They’re a Problem, but Farmers Aren’t the Ones 
Who Can Solve It, WASH. POST (May 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle 
/food/monocrops-theyre-a-problem-but-farmers-arent-the-ones-who-can-solve-it/2014/05 
/09/8bfc186e-d6f8-11e3-8a78-8fe50322a72c_story.html [https://perma.cc/JBU8-KNL6].  
80 Rhoades, supra note 78. 
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pollen drift found a genetic trait for herbicide resistance can be 
transferred at a low frequency to fields of wheat without the herbicide 
resistance approximately 200 feet away—a distance that is “greater 
than [is] usually assumed.”81 Given the uninterpreted meaning of 
“damage,” it could be argued that cross-pollination results in “damage 
to commercial agricultural products,” thereby opening a farmer up to 
liability for nuisance and trespass. Whether or not cross-pollination 
could satisfy the requirements for nuisance or trespass is another 
unexplored area. In order to claim that cross-pollination constituted 
nuisance, for example, a plaintiff would need to establish causation; in 
other words, a plaintiff would need to establish that the pollen 
originated from their neighbor. This can be a steep request, especially 
if there are multiple neighbors all growing similar crops. As a claim for 
trespass operates, intent must be established82—could one farmer’s 
expression of concern about cross-pollination, as exemplified in the 
hypothetical that introduced this Comment, constitute sufficient 
awareness in the other farmer of the intrusion to create liability? In 
order for these allegations to be explored in a courtroom, it would need 
to be accepted that cross-pollination can be the cause of damage. 
C. Constitutional Considerations
Right-to-farm laws are based on a statutory curtailing of the legal 
right of those living next to a farm to bring a trespass or nuisance 
claim.83 Political efforts are being organized in response to right-to-
farm laws based on the notion that these laws are unconstitutional 
exercises of a state’s police power, amounting to an unjust taking 
without compensation.84  
Oregon’s Constitution provides that “every man shall have remedy 
by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or 
81 Colorado State Studies Wheat Cross-Pollination to Other Wheat Crops and Related 
Weeds, COLO. STATE UNIV., PUB. RELS. (Aug. 22, 2005), https://publicrelations.colostate 
.edu/2005/08/22/colorado-state-studies-wheat-cross-pollination-to-other-wheat-crops-and 
-related-weeds/ [https://perma.cc/RG75-B2HU] (quoting researcher Pat Byrne of Colorado
State University’s Department of Soil and Crop Sciences. “Seed producers and other
growers interested in preserving the identity of their crops will likely be interested in these
results.” Id.).
82 Thomas, supra note 4, at 457. 
83 Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative 
Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 103, 
113 (1998). 
84 Id. 
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reputation”85 (the Remedy Clause). Oregon’s right-to-farm law could 
be reasonably interpreted as a deprivation of a remedy for nuisance and 
trespass. One notable case on the matter is Hale v. State.86 Organic 
farmers initially challenged neighboring, nonorganic farmers, alleging 
that the nearby use of pesticides would migrate and trespass onto the 
organic farms.87 That suit was ultimately voluntarily dismissed after 
the nonorganic farmers raised a defense under Oregon’s right-to-farm 
law.88 The organic farmers then brought suit against the state, seeking 
a declaratory judgment that Oregon’s right-to-farm law deprived them 
of their constitutional right to “have remedy by due course of law for 
injury done” to their property.89 The trial court dismissed the organic 
farmers’ case with prejudice, finding that there was no justiciable 
controversy for the courts to consider.90 The farmers appealed.91 
On appeal, the farmers sought a declaration that Oregon’s right-to-
farm law violated Oregon’s Remedy Clause, arguing that such a 
decision would clarify their rights to seek relief in a court against their 
nonorganic farming neighbors.92 The state argued that a finding of 
unconstitutionality “could not affect the ability of the plaintiffs’ 
neighbors, who are not parties, to nonetheless invoke the Act’s 
immunity provision in a future lawsuit.”93 The court of appeals 
ultimately affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, finding that “a judgment 
declaring [Oregon’s right-to-farm law] unconstitutional will have a 
concrete impact on plaintiffs in this case only if several contingencies 
occur. The connection is too speculative.”94 The Oregon Supreme 
Court denied review of the affirmed dismissal.95  
Following the logic in Hale, any constitutional claim against 
Oregon’s right-to-farm law would depend on the actual occurrence of 
the hypothetical, speculative harms that the organic farmers alleged. 
85 OR. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
86 Hale v. State, 314 P.3d 345 (Or. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 354 Or. 840 (2014).  
87 Id. at 346. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. (quoting the Remedy Clause of Oregon’s Constitution). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 347. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 350 (noting that “[t]here is no suggestion by plaintiffs that the circumstances 
that gave rise to the earlier action, which was voluntarily dismissed, somehow present a live 
controversy now. Rather, plaintiffs argue that the prospect of a future chemical drift presents 
a justiciable controversy.” Id. at n.6.).  
95 Hale v. State, 354 Or. 840 (2014) (denying review). 
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The court is implying that the right-to-farm law could be 
unconstitutional, but it would be under very narrow circumstances.96 
In this case, the injuries were too speculative. The court of appeals 
focused on the justiciability of the claim and the trial court did not reach 
the merits of the claim.97 An actual dispute is necessary for a court to 
comment on the scope of damage, as a court cannot issue advisory 
opinions.98 Given the ambiguity of the “damage to commercial 
agricultural products” clause, there could be a successful claim 
challenging the statute for violating the Remedy Clause. While a clear 
definition of “damage” will not prevent all constitutional challenges 
under the Remedy Clause, it is likely that a clearer definition will mean 
that there is less room to debate where the Legislature intended to limit 
access to a remedy and where it did not.  
II 
THREE VIGNETTES FROM OREGON’S FARMLANDS 
Right-to-farm laws curb the legal ramifications of inevitable 
interactions between autonomous actors: one farmer’s right to do as he 
pleases can inherently impact another farmer’s right to do as she 
pleases. The diversity of potential results complicates the 
determination of what constitutes “damage to commercial agricultural 
products” under Oregon law. While a neighbor’s standard agricultural 
practice may easily annihilate one crop, another crop may not react at 
all to the same reasonable practice. The law was not drafted with these 
sorts of disputes in mind—the law was designed to address the 
suburban neighbor who sought a bucolic countryside lifestyle, only to 
be aghast at some of the realities of agriculture.99  
It is useful to consider the ramifications of various interpretations 
of the “damage to commercial agricultural products” exception in 
different areas of Oregonian agriculture. Exploring how the “damage” 
exception actually impacts farmers should be the first step for defining 
damage. The “damage” exception was the Oregon Legislature’s 
attempt at ensuring that farmers could not be shielded from liability for 
96 Beau R. Morgan, Iowa and Right to Farm: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of 
Right to Farm Statutes Across the United States, 53 CREIGHTON L. REV. 623, 633 (2020). 
97 Hale v. State, 314 P.3d 345, 347 (Or. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 354 Or. 840 (2014). 
98 See, e.g., id. 
99 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.933(1)(b), 215.243(3) (2019). 
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unreasonableness or gross negligence.100 The definition of “damage” 
should reflect the weight the Legislature gave to what is reasonable in 
the agricultural context based on actual case studies. Accordingly, three 
vignettes offer insight into how Oregon’s right-to-farm law may be 
understood in reality: wine grapes, genetically modified seeds, and 
marijuana.  
A. The Battle of the Vices: Neighboring Wine Grapes and Marijuana
One farmer’s vice is not necessarily his neighbor’s virtue. Marijuana
and wine grape growers both seek fertile agricultural environments.101 
A shared landscape has resulted in grape growers alleging that the 
odors and oils of nearby marijuana crops are damaging their grapes and 
subsequently impacting their commercial profits.102 
Oregon’s right-to-farm statutory liability shield is pushing these 
sorts of disputes into the federal system.103 Marijuana growers are not 
inherently farming in an unreasonable way; they just happen to be 
adjacent to farmers growing a sensitive crop, especially in the fertile 
Willamette Valley. Without a clear legal remedy at the state level, wine 
grape growers have found potential solace in the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).104  
In Momtazi Family, LLC v. Wagner, U.S. Senior District Judge Anna 
Brown denied a marijuana farmer’s motion to dismiss a complaint 
brought by a neighboring wine grape grower.105 Judge Brown did not 
grant the motion to dismiss because the wine grape grower had 
sufficiently alleged plausible harm so as to continue with a suit under 
RICO.106 The wine grape grower alleged that “one of its customers 
cancelled an order for six tons of grapes grown on [the wine grape 
100 Id. § 30.930(2); Hood River Cnty. v. Mazzara, 89 P.3d 1195, 1196–97 (Or. Ct. App. 
2004). 
101 Brendan Bures, Don’t Taint My Grapes: Wine Producers Worried Nearby Marijuana 




103 See Momtazi Fam., LLC v. Wagner, No. 3:19-CV-00476-BR, 2019 WL 4059178, at 
*7 (D. Or. Aug. 27, 2019).
104 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.
105 Momtazi Fam., 2019 WL 4059178, at *7. 
106 Id.; Mateusz Perkowski, Alleged Marijuana Damage to Grapes Ruled Plausible, 
CAPITAL PRESS (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.capitalpress.com/state/oregon/alleged-marijuana 
-damage-to-grapes-ruled-plausible/article_a95ce280-cf68-11e9-8b22-67ef35339263.html
[https://perma.cc/E8UB-G7LN].
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grower’s] property because of the marijuana operation on Defendants’ 
property [since] [t]he customer believed the smell created by the 
marijuana contaminated the grapes and would affect the wine made 
from those grapes.”107 In other words, the court held that the wine 
grape growers had a plausible claim for relief under RICO because of 
an agricultural nuisance caused by farmers who were reasonably 
growing marijuana under state law. Such a claim would need further 
fact-finding under Oregon’s right-to-farm law as to whether damage to 
commercial agricultural products had occurred; instead, such a claim is 
pushed into federal court, where marijuana remains an illegal 
substance.  
While odor may not inherently seem like a source of “damage to 
commercial agricultural products,” there is plenty of room for debate. 
Smoke from wildfires can impact the taste of grapes and wine.108 
Research has suggested that eucalyptus plants that neighbor vineyards 
can alter the taste of grapes, even after those grapes have been 
processed into wine.109 There is not adequate research on whether 
marijuana aromas and oils impact the growth of the wine grape.110 
Vague statutory language in Oregon’s right-to-farm law, however, is 
preventing these questions from reaching a state-level courtroom. 
Instead, bringing a suit under RICO was deemed the safer alternative—
to bring marijuana growers to federal court since marijuana remains an 
illegal substance at the federal level. 
The Momtazi Family case was filed in federal court after a related 
state-court case had been attempted.111 Under a narrow interpretation 
of Oregon’s right-to-farm law, the odor stemming from the marijuana 
farm would not have caused tangible “damage” to the grapes so as to 
revoke the protection from liability; however, under a broader 
interpretation of Oregon’s right-to-farm law, a court would need to 
have a finding of facts to determine whether or not the marijuana 
farmer’s practices caused damage to the grapes.  
107 Momtazi Fam., 2019 WL 4059178, at *1. 
108 Bures, supra note 101; Andrew Selsky, Wildfires Taint West Coast Vineyards with 
Taste of Smoke, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 23, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus 
-outbreak-wildfires-oregon-fires-wineries-ecead6f181c11c6110f017c9af8e63a2 [https://
perma.cc/S7VV-9QXK].
109 Bures, supra note 101. 
110 See id.  
111 Momtazi Fam., 2019 WL 4059178, at *3. 
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Notably, in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court held 
that plaintiffs “establish[ed] ‘injury to a property interest’ that 
constitutes a ‘concrete financial loss’ sufficient for standing under 
RICO.”112 Implicitly, the court permitted the case to continue beyond 
summary judgment because plaintiffs had established sufficient 
evidence that there had been an economic impact to their commercial 
agricultural product—whether or not such an economic impact to 
commercial agricultural product could be translated to “damage” under 
Oregon’s right-to-farm law remains undetermined. Unless a clarified 
definition of damage is found, the understanding of damage as it relates 
to trespass and nuisance under the right-to-farm law will be shaped by 
the federal court in resolving RICO disputes. 
The definition of damage should be explicitly determined at the state 
level under Oregon’s right-to-farm law, not implicitly under federal 
claims. For one, economic harm determinations will reflect the 
disparities of legality for the recreational marijuana industry. 
Additionally, discussing the damage done to one farmer’s crop on 
another under the regime of RICO pushes the conversation away 
from agricultural themes—themes that are critical to the origin of 
Oregon’s right-to-farm law—and toward matters of criminality and 
marketability. While the Oregon Legislature carved out an exception to 
protect commercial crops, the intent of the exception is only partially 
about marketability. The exception permits liability for trespass and 
nuisance as a way to restrict farmers to reasonable practices; in other 
words, the intent was to communicate to farmers that the exception 
would not shield them from liability for any negligent farming 
practices. The intent of the exception was not to demonize an industrial 
hemp industry that did not exist at the time of the exception’s drafting, 
nor was the intent to push such disputes between farmers to federal 
court.  
From the record, it does not appear that the defendant marijuana 
growers in the Momtazi Family case were engaged in any farming 
practices that would be considered outside the realm of reasonability 
for growing marijuana—it just happened to be next to another farmer’s 
grape crop.113 This case exemplifies how Oregon’s right-to-farm 
law has not evolved with developments in the state’s agricultural 
sector. It is time that the Legislature refine the scope of the “damage 
to commercial agricultural products” exception in light of modern 
112 Id. at *5. 
113 Id. at *1. 
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farming realities so that Oregon farmers have clarity about their 
remedies at the state level.  
B. Genetically Modified Seed Technology Drift and Jackson County
Jackson County’s popular adoption of an ordinance restricting the
cultivation of genetically modified plants offers another case study 
in how an unclear “damage to commercial agricultural products” 
exception results in confusion and unsuccessful private suits. In a case 
challenging the validity of the ban, a court found that Oregon’s right-
to-farm law permitted the ban on genetically modified (GM) seeds 
because the lawmakers designed the ordinance to prevent “damage to 
commercial agricultural products” caused by GM-seed and pesticide 
drift.114  
Despite a statewide ban on counties’ ability to restrict certain seed 
use, Jackson County’s ordinance was only permissible because the 
Legislature specifically created a narrow carve-out for the county’s 
GM-crop ban.115 Regardless of where one falls on the merits of the 
claim that GM-seed and pesticide drift results in damage, the Jackson 
County case exemplifies how an unclear understanding of the right-to-
farm exception results in inconsistency at the state level. The case 
illustrates the agricultural tension between individual autonomy and 
collective ecological responsibility. Additionally, the case exemplifies 
how state-level and local-level preferences in agriculture can vary. 
Questions that are inherently about a farmer’s autonomy on their own 
land and what duty is owed to their farming neighbor are pushed into 
courtrooms cloaked in case-specific financial questions.  
1. Some Background on Genetically Modified Seed Drift
Much of the debate about pollen drift and agricultural damages
has centered on the cross-pollination of patented genetically modified 
(GM) seeds into the fields of neighboring farmers who grow either non-
genetically modified (non-GM) crops or organic crops.116 Genetic drift 
114 See Schultz Fam. Farms LLC v. Jackson Cnty., No. 1:14-CV-01975, 2015 WL 
3448069, at *5 (D. Or. May 29, 2015). 
115 Id. 
116 For a crop to be certified as organic by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, it cannot 
be grown from a genetically modified seed; however, not all non-GM crops are certifiably 
organic—a designation that also depends on the crop being free of prohibited substances. 
Miles McEvoy, Organic 101: Can GMOs Be Used in Organic Products?, U.S. DEP’T OF 
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can transpire when the patented genetic material (here, seeds) moves 
onto another farmer’s property, resulting in liability for that farmer 
who is not contracted with the patent-owner.117 Intent to acquire the 
patented commodity without authorization is not an element of patent 
infringement.118 Thus, regardless of whether the non-GM farmer is 
aware that the patented seeds have crossed onto their property or not, 
the farmer can face liability for patent infringement.119 Given the 
equitable considerations of this scenario, much of the legal discussion 
about cross-pollination and agricultural damages centers on genetically 
modified seeds and patent protections, rather than right-to-farm laws.  
An emphasis on genetically modified seeds and patent protections is 
not unwarranted. Monsanto, for example, has repeatedly brought patent 
infringement claims against non-GM farmers for having their fields 
contaminated with Monsanto’s patented seeds—even though many of 
the farmers specifically did not want Monsanto’s seeds.120 On top of 
legal costs, organic farmers face an economic loss from cross-
contamination, as their crops would no longer be eligible to be certified 
as organic by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.121 Even more 
concerning, an accidental cross-contamination of seeds that have been 
genetically engineered to kill their own embryos (so as to prevent 
farmers from saving and replanting patented seeds in subsequent 
seasons) could unintentionally destroy a neighboring farmer’s future 
crop yields.122 Even slight cross-contamination could result in 
commercial retailers rejecting a farmer’s formerly organic products, 
forcing the farmer to sell their crops at much lower prices.123  
One of the most relevant cases on the matter stems from Canada: 
after pollen from Monsanto’s Roundup Ready™ crops had cross-
pollinated onto Percy Schmeiser’s farm, resulting in his crops being 
contaminated, Monsanto sued, alleging that Schmeiser had saved 
patented seeds.124 Monsanto alleged that Schmeiser had saved seeds, 
AGRIC. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2013/05/17/organic-101-can 
-gmos-be-used-organic-products [https://perma.cc/GM3P-VUC3].
117 Justin T. Rogers, The Encroachment of Intellectual Property Protections on the
Rights of Farmers, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 149, 164 (2010).
118 Mitchell, supra note 60, at 320.  
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 314. 
121 Id. 
122 See Rogers, supra note 117, at 161; see also Mitchell, supra note 60, at 320.  
123 Thomas P. Redick, Coexistence of Biotech and Non-GMO or Organic Crops, 
19 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 39, 55 (2014). 
124 Rogers, supra note 117, at 164. 
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despite Schmeiser’s never having purchased seeds from Monsanto.125 
Ultimately, Canada’s Supreme Court upheld an award of damages for 
Monsanto, consisting of Schmeiser’s profits for that year and technical 
fees.126 Canada’s highest court noted that “it was [Schmeiser’s] 
responsibility to destroy the seed that was windblown onto his property, 
not Monsanto’s.”127 While this case is from Canada, the logic used by 
Canada’s Supreme Court represents a potential danger for American 
farmers given the amount of litigation that Monsanto brings for similar 
fact patterns.128 Oregon represents an important legal ground for this 
sort of litigation, given the agricultural nature of the state and the large 
number of non-GM farms.  
Some have suggested requiring a showing of intent in patent 
infringement cases involving patented seed cross-contamination, or 
otherwise using a farmer’s organic certification as a valid affirmative 
defense against patent infringement in cases involving patented seed 
cross-contamination.129 While this may help farmers who have had 
patented seeds cross onto their property, it is unlikely to aid Oregon 
courts in establishing whether or not commercial damage has occurred 
upon conventional cross-contamination under Oregon’s right-to-farm 
law. There must be an understanding of “damage” to commercial crops 
outside of the context of patent infringement, given the number of 
organic farms in Oregon.130 
2. Jackson County Farmers’ Attempt for Local Autonomy
A right-to-farm law is intended to give the farmer autonomy to
continue long-standing agricultural practices without new, unfamiliar 
neighbors bringing legal interference. However, Oregon’s right-to-
farm law has also inhibited Oregonian farmers’ sense of autonomy in 
the context of the GM-seed debate. The story of Jackson County offers 




128 See id.  
129 See Mitchell, supra note 60, at 327–31. 
130 As of 2016, Oregon had 195,000 acres of certified organic farming (resulting in $351 
million in sales), which ranked Oregon as the sixth largest grower of certified organic crop 
acreage in the United States. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2016 
Certified Organic Survey: Sales Up 23 Percent (Oct. 2017), https://www.nass.usda.gov 
/Publications/Highlights/2017/2016_Certified_Organic_Survey_Highlights.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Y8P5-3JCL].  
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powerful entities at the expense of the Oregonian farmer. The 
interpretation of “damage to commercial agricultural products” is a 
critical part of the story. 
Farmers are well aware of the dangers of pollen drift between 
property lines. In 2014, residents of Jackson County passed a ballot 
measure, Jackson County Ordinance 635, that would ban the growth of 
genetically engineered crops in the county.131 The measure was 
supposed “to protect local farmers from ‘significant economic harm to 
organic farmers and to other farmers who choose to grow non-
genetically engineered crops’ that can be caused by ‘genetic drift’ from 
[genetically engineered] crops.”132 Advocates for the ordinance also 
focused on the environmental effects of pesticide drift from lots with 
GM-crops onto non-GM lots.133 However, farmers who had already 
planted genetically modified Roundup Ready™ alfalfa seeds 
challenged the ordinance, claiming that the ordinance was in violation 
of Oregon’s right-to-farm law.134  
In Schultz Family Farms LLC v. Jackson County, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the ordinance would force them to destroy their planted 
alfalfa seeds—a taking without just compensation.135 Plaintiffs sought 
either injunctive and declaratory relief to permanently enjoin 
enforcement of the ban or otherwise for an award of damages for the 
mandatory destruction of their GM-seeds.136 The County responded 
that the ordinance was in compliance with the right-to-farm state 
scheme and that the ordinance falls under an exception of the recently 
passed “Seed Bill.”137 In 2013, the Oregon Legislature enacted Senate 
Bill 863, codified partially at ORS 633.738, which barred enactment or 
enforcement of any local law or regulation “to inhibit or prevent the 
production or use of agricultural seed, flower seed, nursery seed or 
vegetable seed.”138 However, in an uncodified section of Senate Bill 
863, additional legislation was enacted to provide that ORS 633.738 
131 Bennett, supra note 27, at 3.  
132 Id. at 5 (quoting JACKSON CNTY., OR., CODE § 635.02(c)). 
133 Katelyn Harrop, This County in Oregon Completely Banned GMO Crops. Here Is 
Why That Matters for the Environment, THINK PROGRESS (June 9, 2015), https:// 
archive.thinkprogress.org/this-county-in-oregon-completely-banned-gmo-crops-heres-why 
-that-matters-for-the-environment-3444c92b5001/#:~:text [https://perma.cc/CX4N-8W87].
134 Schultz Fam. Farms LLC v. Jackson Cnty., No. 1:14-CV-01975, 2015 WL 3448069,
at *1 (D. Or. May 29, 2015).
135 Id.  
136 Id. at *2. 
137 Id. at *1. 
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did not apply if the local regulation was “(1) [p]roposed by initiative 
petition and, on or before January 21, 2013, qualified for placement on 
the ballot in a county; and (2) [a]pproved by the electors of the county 
at an election held on May 20, 2014.”139 This is the exact timeline of 
the Jackson County ballot measure process for the ban on GM-seeds. 
As the District Court noted, “It is undisputed that the [exception to ORS 
633.738 described above] applies to Jackson County Ordinance 
635.”140  
The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon determined that 
the local ordinance barring use of genetically modified seeds was valid 
on its face under the right-to-farm law and was also specifically 
authorized by state law.141 The court was convinced by legislative 
history that demonstrated a clear exemption that was supposed to be 
afforded to Jackson County’s local ordinance.142 The court also found 
that the text and context of Oregon’s right-to-farm law authorized the 
ordinance as being designed to protect against damage to commercial 
agricultural crops caused by GM-seed drift.143 
The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that the “damage 
to commercial agricultural products” necessitated a showing of 
“actionable damage” and that Jackson County’s ordinance 
impermissibly applied to all GM farming without requiring evidence 
of actual damage.144 Instead, the court noted that the Ordinance was 
designed to prevent the “damage to commercial agricultural products” 
before any damage actually occurred, and that nothing about Oregon’s 
right-to-farm scheme demonstrated a requirement to show actionable 
damages before enactment of such a local ordinance.145  
Schultz was the first case in Oregon on whether local restrictions 
on certain agricultural practices violate Oregon’s right-to-farm law.146 
This case has been cited in arguments in opposition to amending 
or altering the law, under the notion that Schultz demonstrates the 
adaptability of the right-to-farm law with any change potentially 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at *2. 
142 Id. at *5–6. 
143 Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Bennett, supra note 27, at 7. 
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benefitting large, industrial farms.147 Schultz demonstrates that the 
Oregon Legislature can create carve-outs that would allow for more 
flexibility via the “damage to commercial agricultural products” 
exception—here, the Legislature created an exception for Jackson 
County’s GM-seed ban in a bill that would have otherwise barred 
regulation of seed use by farmers.148 The expansive nature of the 
damage exception could be seen as a perk for allowing flexibility.149 
However, this expansiveness can result in arbitrary and inconsistent 
application. County-by-county carve-outs to address the needs of only 
some of a county’s farmers will result in the wealthier, more powerful 
farmers’ needs being better heard in Salem. While the nonorganic 
farmers in Schultz did not leave the courtroom victorious in their 
challenge of an ordinance that organic farmers had spearheaded, power 
dynamics in Oregon agriculture are much more nuanced than affluent 
nonorganic farmers versus the smallholder organic farmers. Regardless 
of who the actors are on each side of the fence, flexible interpretation 
of any statutory exception is likely to bend toward the actor who has 
deeper pockets. 
C. Marijuana in Oregon and the Right-to-Farm
Oregon’s right-to-farm law is facing new scrutiny given the 
legalization of recreational possession of marijuana and the ensuing 
marijuana-industry boom.150 As marijuana and hemp are grown on an 
industrial level, there is an increased risk for cross-pollination of hemp 
and marijuana—an interaction that can drastically alter the commercial 
value for both crops.151 Potential legal disputes about cross-pollination 
between commercial marijuana farmers and commercial hemp farmers 
are likely to be as contentious as the GM cross-pollination disputes.152 
With Oregon’s right-to-farm law’s “damage” exception, there will 
likely be suits that attempt to claim that cross-pollination constitutes 
“damage to commercial agricultural products.” Beyond such a claim’s 
147 Id. at 24–25. 
148 Id. 
149 See id. 
150 Ryan McGuire, Member Blog: Cross-Pollination Poised to Prompt Litigation in 
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ecological implications, claiming that cross-pollination resulted in 
damage to crops extends far beyond the legislative intent behind 
Oregon’s right-to-farm law. If the Oregon Legislature determines that 
the right-to-farm law is the proper law to govern such a dispute, then 
clarification must be provided on what the permissible scope is for 
defining damage. 
Cannabis sativa, the basis for both hemp and marijuana production, 
is a dioecious species, whereby its male and female flowers are on two 
distinct plants.153 Hemp and marijuana both come from cannabis and 
are distinguished in the law based on the levels of tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC), with hemp referring to cannabis that contains 0.3% or less THC 
content; conversely, marijuana has a THC content of above 0.3%.154 A 
female flower that has not been exposed to male pollen has a higher 
concentration of cannabinoids, like THC and cannabidiol (CBD), as 
compared to the male flower.155 If the end goal is marijuana with a 
higher THC content or hemp with a high CBD content, the farmer 
needs to maintain an exclusively female crop.156 
Farmers who seek to grow a final product with a higher potency of 
THC or CBD will use the female flower and remove any lower-value 
male flowers, if they materialize, to prevent pollination.157 Consumers 
are willing to pay a higher price for female-only cannabis products with 
higher THC.158 However, hemp producers also need distance from 
marijuana growers to protect their product’s marketability due to 
unintended THC content.159 Hemp growers must demolish their crop 
per federal regulations if the hemp surpasses a 0.3% THC concentration 
limit.160 Some male plants that contain higher levels of THC can 
pollinate female flowers that are intended to have a lower level of THC, 
which results in seeds that produce plants with higher levels of THC 
than the original female plant. This later results in seeds that produce 
153 McGuire, supra note 150. 
154 Sian Ferguson, Hemp vs. Marijuana: What’s the Difference?, HEALTHLINE (Aug. 
27, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health/hemp-vs-marijuana [https://perma.cc/LD2V 
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plants with lower levels of CBD and cannabigerol (CBG).161 The male 
crop releases pollen that can interfere with a female plant that is 
intended to produce a certain level of THC or CBD.  
Cross-pollination between male and female flowers of Cannabis 
sativa can result in lower crop yields, seed production, and, depending 
on the interaction, a higher or lower value of CBD or THC in the 
flowers that are grown.162 Cross-pollination can occur even when the 
plants are at a great distance from one another. While industry experts 
advise a minimum of ten miles of distance between different outdoor 
fields, research on cannabis pollen indicates that it is likely that the 
pollen can travel even further than ten miles.163 The USDA’s federal 
regulations on hemp production offer no guidance for an appropriate 
distance between hemp and marijuana production sites.164 Suits for 
negligence or trespass could be an avenue for remedy for damages 
caused by cross-pollination.165  
Litigation from such interactions between the different plants has 
already occurred in Oregon. In Jack Hempicine LLC v. Leo Mulkey 
Inc., plaintiff Jack Hempicine, a hemp grower, alleged that male 
flowers from neighboring lots cross-pollinated onto his property, 
rendering plaintiff’s crop unmarketable, and alleged damages in excess 
of $8,000,000 in lost crop value.166 Hempicine was concerned about 
cross-pollination from his neighbor’s male plants, which could impact 
his hemp, grown for its higher CBD content from feminized seeds.167 
Hempicine alleged that he told the defendants, who were neighboring 
hemp farmers, that he grew only feminized seeds and that he worried 
about potential cross-pollination from defendants’ male plants.168 
Hempicine alleged that, despite his notices, the neighboring defendants 
grew male hemp seeds that cross-pollinated onto Hempicine’s 
feminized plants, resulting in high levels of THC that made the hemp 
161 Canna Law Blog: Oregon Industrial Hemp Litigation: Won’t You Be My Neighbor?, 
HARRIS BRICKEN (Sept. 8, 2018), https://harrisbricken.com/cannalawblog/oregon-industrial 
-hemp-litigation-wont-you-be-my-neighbor/ [https://perma.cc/2GT4-F27J] (citing the
pleadings of Jack Hempicine LLC v. Leo Mulkey Inc., No. 18CV38712, Polk Cnty. Cir.
Ct.).
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unmarketable.169 The damages of $8,000,000 reflected Hempicine’s 
alleged damages for the loss of the crops for the 2016–2017 growing 
cycle; the complaint stated that it would need to include later damages 
for the lost crops for the subsequent 2018 growing cycle.170  
The complaint alleged that the neighboring defendants negligently 
breached a duty of care owed to Hempicine, that the defendants acted 
negligently and were accordingly liable for either nuisance or trespass, 
and that the defendants knew that cross-pollination was likely to occur 
and, therefore, intentionally interfered with Hempicine’s economic 
relations.171 However, the implications of such a suit on Oregon’s 
right-to-farm law never materialized. In late February 2021, the court 
dismissed the case with prejudice and without costs.172 
When Oregon’s right-to-farm law was first drafted and subsequently 
updated, commercial marijuana and industrial hemp were not deemed 
legitimate (or legal) commercial agricultural products. Despite efforts 
from the cannabis industry during the creation of Oregon’s cannabis 
legislation, the legislature failed to consider the impacts of cross-
pollination in that scheme.173 Vagueness in the “damage to commercial 
agricultural products” exception will continue to result in similar 
private suits, leading to further confusion and undesirable outcomes for 
the future of autonomy, farming relations, and ecological care for the 
land of others. In the ambiguity, farmers are left to communicate with 
their neighbors to try to ensure that unintentional cross-pollination does 
not occur.174  
Hempicine argued that the neighbor’s plants damaged his 
commercial agricultural product, thereby permitting a nuisance or 
trespass claim under the right-to-farm law exception. Hempicine’s 
claim was dependent on Oregon’s right-to-farm law not shielding his 
neighbor from trespass or nuisance liability. For a court to fully take 
Hempicine’s position, it would first need to find that a neighbor owes 
a duty of care to protect Hempicine’s economic outcome from the far-
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tried to communicate his concerns to his neighbor, as the Oregon 
Department of Agriculture has advised farmers to do.176  
However, did the neighboring defendants, by growing male seeds, 
do anything that the Oregon Legislature was trying to prevent in 
creating Oregon’s right-to-farm law? Surely, if Oregon recognizes 
farming autonomy as a value worth statutorily codifying,177 the 
Legislature did not intend to restrict one farmer’s ability to grow male 
seeds, with its own commercial benefit, in order to benefit another 
farmer’s commercial outcomes. Does the defendant farmer in Jack 
Hempicine LLC not have their own so-called right-to-farm? At 
the same time, Hempicine experienced an economic loss due 
to neighboring pollen’s technical trespass. The Oregon Legislature 
was not considering these sorts of pollen interactions when drafting 
the right-to-farm scheme; as such, both parties in the case have 
understandable grievances.  
The “damage to commercial agricultural products” exception was 
intended to afford farmers a remedy when other farmers engaged in 
unreasonable practices that caused economic harm.178 This exception 
was drafted in the context of a shield from liability in private suits 
brought by residential communities that grew alongside farmlands.179 
It seems imprudent and contrary to the legislative intent to designate 
cross-pollination, a natural process that is largely outside a farmer’s 
control, as a source of damage that could remove a farmer’s liability 
protections for nuisance and trespass claims from neighboring farmers. 
Absent a clear definition of damage, however, such a claim is subject 
to debate. 
Hemp does not change when it commingles; therefore, courts are 
likely to be wary of imposing a duty on hemp growers to protect the 
economic potential of their neighbors.180 Since the injured party is 
being paid for purity of his product, he has a duty to “fence in” his crop 
to avoid contamination by external actors.181 Since the purity of the 
product is for the benefit of the farmer growing it, it logically follows 
that the grower should assume the expense of shielding it from 
corrupting sources, not a third party with nothing to gain from the 
purity. 
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Marijuana is an especially interesting case study for interpreting the 
meaning of “damage to commercial agricultural products,” given the 
great distance that the pollen can travel.182 However, the pollen 
problem extends to other crops. If a farmer can be liable to his neighbor 
for cross-pollination, the farmer has a greater incentive to grow what 
his neighbor grows; the incentives result in a mono-crop culture, which 
comes with its own environmental consequences.183 A farmer has only 
so much land with which to cultivate his crop. A failure to proactively 
avoid the cross-pollination of female-only crops could be interpreted 
as a farmer failing to provide due care, thereby serving as the basis of 
a negligence claim. If cross-pollination is deemed capable of causing 
“damage to commercial agricultural products,” farmers could be open 
to liability for nuisance or trespass for processes often outside their 
control. Similar conflicts are likely to arise again. 
Even if cross-pollination could be established for purposes of 
causation, the cross-pollination did not result in the destruction of 
Hempicine’s crop. Hempicine’s products remained marketable, despite 
the final product not being the pure version that he intended. Male seeds 
can be grown from female plants, even if feminized. To hold that the 
occurrence of male seeds in a field of feminized plants is damage is to 
hold that a natural process that the plant itself carries out is damaging. 
Such a claim is too distanced from the legislative intent behind 
Oregon’s right-to-farm law. Increased THC content is not the sort of 
damage that the Legislature had in mind when drafting the right-to-
farm language; however, an unclear definition of “damage” done to 
commercial agricultural products will result in private suits between 
farmers like Hempicine. Oregon’s right-to-farm law, at least in its 
current iteration, is not the correct law to resolve such a conflict.  
CONCLUSION 
Agriculture implicates varying duties to people and to the land. A 
farmer has a duty to his farm and family; a farmer also has a duty to the 
land and to his neighbors. Disputes between farmers are as old as farms 
themselves. However, Oregon’s Legislature could elucidate the 
damage exception of the right-to-farm law to mitigate the likelihood of 
disputes between neighbors. The vague understanding of the “damage 
to commercial agricultural products” exception will continue to result 
182 Id. 
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in confusion, suits that are doomed before they enter the courtroom, 
and a power imbalance between those who can fight for a remedy and 
those who cannot afford to. 
The vignettes presented in this Comment illustrate how power 
dynamics are operating on Oregon farms through the right-to-farm law. 
The purpose of this Comment is not to suggest a specific definition of 
“damage,” but rather to highlight how power dynamics are currently 
operating. The Oregon Legislature can recognize that power dynamics 
fluidly operate in disputes between farmers by expounding the right-
to-farm laws to either clarify “damage” to eliminate a farmer’s shield 
from liability for nuisance or trespass, or better still, to create a new 
scheme that distinguishes disputes between farmers from disputes 
between farmers and urbanites. Only by exploring power dynamics in 
vignettes such as those presented in this Comment can the legislature 
determine whether it is tenable to still use the right-to-farm law to 
govern farmer-against-farmer disputes. 
Currently, farmers are using the right-to-farm law to litigate 
incompatible, albeit reasonable, farming practices. “Damage” can be 
defined in a way that clarifies the ambiguity without changing the status 
quo—in other words, “damage” could be defined in a manner that 
allows farmers to sue one another for reasonable practices that have 
third-party impacts. It may not be possible to define “damage” in a way 
that completely recognizes farmers’ reasonable incompatibilities. 
Farming operates in so many contexts, as illustrated in the vignettes, 
that a definition of “damage” that reflects all these varying contexts 
would be nearly impossible. However, if the inherent property tension 
is highlighted in the definition of “damage,” then Oregon legislators 
can better prevent frivolous litigation and clarify a farmer’s duty to her 
neighbor.  
Oregon’s Legislature could determine that a duty is owed to one’s 
neighbor and that any degradation of economic potential constitutes 
“damage to commercial agricultural products.” Alternatively, the 
Oregon Legislature could also require a showing of complete 
destruction of a crop before a farmer can face liability for nuisance or 
trespass under the right-to-farm law—essentially finding that a farmer 
must accept the conditions associated with living in an agricultural 
zone, just as residential communities must accept such conditions.184  
The Legislature may require a showing of recklessness, 
malfeasance, or intent for a farmer to establish that her neighbor’s crop 
184 See § 30.933(2)(c). 
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damaged her own crop due to cross-pollination; or it could determine 
that a natural process of cross-pollination does not open a farmer up to 
liability under any circumstances. 
No matter what the Oregon Legislature supposes to comprise 
“damage to commercial agricultural products,” it should clarify the 
scope of the exception. The lives and commercial well-being of 
Oregon’s farmers could hang in the balance. Oregon has codified its 
commitment to protecting the economic well-being of farmers.185 It 
should elucidate what will and will not remove a farmer’s shield from 
liability for nuisance and trespass to clarify its commitment to 
protecting farmers, if the respect of agrarianism is to be preserved in 
Oregon. 
185 See id. § 30.933(1)(a). 
216 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100, 181 
